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ONE MORTGAGE: A MODEL OF SUCCESS 
FOR LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP 
CLARK L. ZIEGLER* 
ELLIOT SCHMIEDL** 
THOMAS CALLAHAN*** 
Abstract: A 1989 report by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston identified 
major racial disparities in mortgage lending in the City of Boston that could 
not be explained by income, credit scores, or other objective underwriting fac-
tors. In response, city and state officials, community organizations, and major 
banking institutions joined together in 1990 to design and launch what is now 
the Massachusetts ONE Mortgage program. The program is built around a 
low down payment mortgage loan with discounted interest rates, a state fund-
ed loan loss reserve that eliminates the need for mortgage insurance, retention 
of servicing and credit risk by the originating lenders for the life of the loans, 
a rigorous homebuyer education requirement for all participating borrowers, 
and a network of post-purchase support including immediate intervention on 
delinquent loans. After twenty-five years of operation, $3.4 billion in mort-
gage originations and nearly 20,000 home purchases by low- and moderate-
income homebuyers, the program has been a resounding success. About half 
of all loans have been to households of color, and about two-thirds of the 
home purchases have been in urban neighborhoods that are historically under-
served by conventional credit. Delinquency rates have been comparable to 
prime loans, and foreclosure rates have been substantially lower than prime 
loans. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1968, elected officials and bankers in Boston designed a mortgage 
program in the wake of the urban rioting that followed the assassination of 
Reverend Martin Luther King. It was called Boston Banks Urban Renewal 
Group, or B-BURG, and the legacy of that program is one of foreclosure, 
redlining, and blockbusting. “Drive-by” home inspections, 100% govern-
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ment guarantees, lack of community input, and no down payments were just 
some of the problems that plagued the program from the outset and led to 
record foreclosure rates in just a few years, as detailed in the book The 
Death of an American Jewish Community: A Tragedy of Good Intentions. 
(Levine & Harmon 1992). 
Some twenty years later, most banks had become wary of inner-city 
mortgage lending and had largely stayed away from engaging in Boston’s 
communities of color. Mortgage lending suffered and bank branches were 
closed in the communities that needed them most. (Dreier 1991, 18–19). 
Eventually, a 1989 study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston was leaked 
to the press, and found a pattern of racial bias in Boston’s mortgage lending 
over the intervening period that could not be explained by income, credit 
history, or other legitimate loan underwriting factors. (Munnell et al. 1992, 
50–51). 
In response to public outcry and a community-led campaign about the 
Federal Reserve study, representatives from the Massachusetts Housing 
Partnership (MHP), the Massachusetts Bankers Association, the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, the City of Boston, the Massachusetts Affordable 
Housing Alliance (MAHA), and other community advocacy groups began 
meeting to find common ground and potential solutions. This working 
group, informed by regular feedback from potential first-time homebuyers, 
focused on designing a mortgage product that would promote responsible 
new underwriting standards for inner-city properties. It sought to address 
common barriers to low-income, first-time homeownership, particularly 
high minimum down payments and costly private mortgage insurance. 
The process resulted in the SoftSecond Loan Program, a collaborative 
program between the banking industry and state government. SoftSecond 
was initially launched as a pilot program in Boston in 1991 and expanded 
statewide in 1992 to ensure that mortgage lending would be available on 
reasonable terms to traditionally underserved borrowers and neighborhoods. 
The program operated with few changes through 2013 when MHP launched 
SoftSecond’s successor, the ONE Mortgage program. ONE Mortgage main-
tained the same features that made SoftSecond so affordable, discussed in 
detail in Sections II and III below, and simplified the structure of the loan, 
enabling more lenders to participate. 
Since the program’s inception, it has served over 5,000 first-time 
homebuyers in the City of Boston and nearly 20,000 first-time homebuyers 
statewide. Two-thirds of the loans in Boston support home purchases by 
households of color, and half of the loans statewide support households of 
color. The program is administered by MHP, which oversees loan origina-
tion by participating lenders, and support services are delivered by home-
buyer education and counseling partner agencies. 
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The program also has two other “owners”—the lenders themselves 
who originate, hold, and, in most cases, service the loans, and the communi-
ty organizations, led by MAHA and its Homeownership Action Network, 
which work to encourage lender participation and increase the impact of the 
program across the state. This unique buy-in from three sectors—public, 
private and non-profit—contributes to the staying power of the program. 
There is no other multi-bank affordable mortgage lending program with the 
scale and duration of the ONE Mortgage Program anywhere else in the 
country. 
I. LENDER PARTICIPATION AND LOAN PROCESSING 
Under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and its Massachusetts 
counterpart, banks have an obligation to reinvest in the communities where 
they do business. (CRA; Massachusetts CRA). Yet, in most parts of the 
country, bank credit for low- and moderate-income homebuyers is limited to 
conventional, higher-cost mortgage products available via the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), or the Federal Housing Admin-
istration (FHA). (Campen 1997). Massachusetts has been a consistent ex-
ception to this rule. Through the ONE Mortgage and SoftSecond programs, 
banks and credit unions have put $3.4 billion of private sector capital into 
Massachusetts neighborhoods since 1991 at lower rates and on more re-
sponsive credit terms than would have otherwise been available. 
The Massachusetts Housing Partnership (MHP) works closely with the 
Massachusetts Bankers Association to cultivate strong relationships with 
prospective and participating lenders. ONE Mortgage is currently offered 
by thirty-seven banks and credit unions throughout Massachusetts, varying 
in size and geographic scope. Participating lenders understand the pro-
gram’s intricacies as well as its importance within the mortgage market, and 
are dedicated to community lending through the CRA. MHP is continually 
working with and seeking prospective lenders in an effort to expand the 
ONE Mortgage network and reach more eligible first-time homebuyers who 
could benefit from the program’s affordable terms. 
MHP maintains a web-based loan processing system called Es2 that 
participating lenders use to input loans to gain MHP approval. The system 
is easy to use, and quickly provides participating lenders with information 
about ONE Mortgage loans in their pipeline. It calculates qualifying ratios, 
principal, interest, tax and insurance payments, and interest subsidy and 
loan loss reserve allocations. In order to streamline the closing process, 
once a loan is approved and ready to proceed to closing, Es2 produces clos-
ing documents specific to each loan. 
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II. PROGRAM MECHANICS 
A ONE Mortgage is a 30-year, fixed-rate loan with a minimum 3% 
down payment (5% for three-family properties) that is originated and held 
in portfolio by a Massachusetts bank or credit union. First-time homebuyers 
with incomes at or below the area median income are eligible to participate 
in the program. Lenders provide a 30 basis point interest rate discount for 
the life of the loan. For eligible homebuyers below 80% of the area median 
income, a state-funded interest rate subsidy further reduces monthly pay-
ments during the first seven years of homeownership. 
The monthly interest subsidy payments are never more than 25% of 
the borrower’s principal and interest payment. The subsidy payments re-
main constant for the first four years, then are gradually reduced in years 
five, six, and seven. In year eight the borrower graduates into making the 
full principal and interest payment. Interest subsidy can reduce the borrow-
er’s effective interest rate by up to 2 whole percentage points (200 basis 
points). When borrowers sell or transfer the property, the amount of subsidy 
they have received over the life of the loan may be required to be repaid to 
the Massachusetts Housing Partnership (MHP) at 0% interest. The ONE 
Mortgage structure is summarized in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. 
 
No mortgage insurance is required because participating lenders retain 
shared risk and the program includes a loan loss reserve administered by 
MHP. This unique structure allows the program to serve low- to moderate-
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income homebuyers who would not otherwise qualify for mortgage financ-
ing from traditional mortgage lenders or would only qualify for a product 
with much higher monthly payments (Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) loan payments are approximately $300 per month higher for the typ-
ical borrower due in part to the mortgage insurance premium), thereby in-
creasing household cash flow and generally decreasing the risk of default. 
An Affordable Mortgage Comparison Chart comparing ONE Mortgage to 
an alternative state housing finance agency product and to FHA (My Mass 
Mortgage 2017) is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. 
Affordable Mortgage Comparison Chart 
(Estimated payments for a $250,000 Mortgage)  
Source: mymassmortgage.org 
 
Unlike some homebuyer programs which cap resale prices (e.g., Irvine 
Campus Housing Authority) and thus prevent low-income homeowners 
from accumulating wealth, SoftSecond and ONE homeowners may sell 
their properties at market prices. Any interest subsidy provided to the 
homeowner is required to be repaid upon sale; after five years of ownership 
the subsidy repayment obligation is capped to allow homeowners to retain 
at least 80% of any net appreciation. 
III. UNDERWRITING GUIDELINES 
The Massachusetts Housing Partnership (MHP) employs rigorous yet 
flexible underwriting terms in order to address the variety of situations fac-
ing low- and moderate-income first-time homebuyers in Massachusetts. The 
general underwriting criteria of the ONE Mortgage Program are designed to 
be consistent with the terms of the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(“Fannie Mae”) Selling Guide. However, there are several areas where 
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MHP has created specific guidance in an effort to address certain underwrit-
ing concerns. 
A. Credit 
ONE Mortgage has credit floors designed to both meet the needs of the 
target population and mitigate credit risk. The minimum representative 
credit score for a single-family or condominium is 660, and the minimum 
representative credit score for a two- or three-family property is 680. 
MHP allows exceptions to the minimum representative credit score re-
quirement only for those borrowers with insufficient traditional credit histo-
ry. This option is designed for borrowers who lack credit, including younger 
buyers with limited credit histories and recent immigrants. Using non-
traditional credit requires documentation of twelve months’ payment history 
from at least three sources, including rent and utilities. Non-traditional cred-
it cannot be used for someone who has a sufficient credit history but does 
not meet the minimum credit score requirements. 
B. Qualifying Ratios 
To accommodate borrowers at various affordability levels, ONE Mort-
gage maintains a tiered approach to qualifying ratios. Condominiums and 
single-family properties are subject to a strictly enforced maximum hous-
ing-to-income ratio of 36% and a maximum debt-to-income ratio of 43%. 
Within these limits lie two tiers. Tier 1 allows for a housing-to-income ratio 
of up to 33% and a debt-to-income ratio of up to 38%. Loans that fall within 
Tier 1 and meet the program credit score requirements receive an automatic 
approval within our electronic loan processing system. Tier 2 consists of 
loans with housing-to-income ratios over 33% but under 36%, and debt-to-
income ratios over 38% but under 43%. Loans in this tier require a combi-
nation of at least three compensating factors in addition to meeting the pro-
gram credit score requirement. 
Compensating factors are used to complement a Tier 2 loan, and can 
include a combination of the following: a minimum representative credit 
score that exceeds the minimum requirements, a minimum of two months of 
reserves (liquid funds available after closing), a maximum payment shock 
less than or equal to 20% (percentage change between pre-mortgage hous-
ing obligation and combined principal, interest, taxes, and insurance) doc-
umented by twelve months of rent checks or substantial employment stabil-
ity. 
When calculating qualifying ratios for multifamily properties, ONE 
Mortgage allows the use of 65% of the gross monthly rental income to be 
added to the borrower’s underwriting/qualifying income. Two-family prop-
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erties are underwritten to a maximum housing-to-income ratio of 45% and a 
maximum debt-to-income ratio of 50%. Three-family properties are under-
written using only a maximum debt-to-income ratio of 50%. ONE Mort-
gage Underwriting Ratios are summarized in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. 
Underwriting Ratios – Condominiums and Single-Families 
 Housing-to-Income 
Ratio 
Total DTI 
Tier 1 33% 38% 
Tier 2 36% 43% 
Year 8: 
 
Maximum Unsubsidized 
Housing-to-Income Ratio 
(Applies only to loans 
w/interest subsidy) 
41% - 
 
Underwriting Ratios – Two Family Properties 
 Housing-to-Income 
Ratio 
Total DTI 
Maximum Ratio at Origi-
nation 45% 50% 
Year 8: 
Maximum Unsubsidized     
Housing-to-Income Ratio 
(Applies only to loans 
w/interest subsidy) 
50% - 
C. Condominium Underwriting 
ONE Mortgage follows Fannie Mae Underwriting Guidelines on the 
majority of issues surrounding condominium underwriting. However, un-
derstanding the complexity, and in some cases, the limitations of traditional 
condominium underwriting, MHP works closely with partner lenders to en-
sure that common sense decisions are made that do not limit the program 
from being used to purchase both affordable deed-restricted and market-rate 
condominiums. To this end, MHP has created specific guidance regarding 
pre-sale requirements that allow lenders to underwrite ONE Mortgage loans 
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in condominium projects that do not meet Fannie Mae Guidelines. To quali-
fy under this specific guidance, properties must fall within a small project 
(two to four units), or a project that is either 100% affordable or deed-
restricted, or a project that contains a mix of market-rate and affordable 
deed-restricted units. 
D. Three-Family Properties 
The ability to purchase a multi-family property and begin building 
wealth has always been an integral part of the program. Three-family prop-
erties represent an opportunity for qualified first-time homebuyers to be-
come landlords, and to realize the financial gains that can come with man-
aging income-generating units. However, given the increased risk of pur-
chasing a three-family property, the program’s underwriting guidelines have 
been strengthened to include a 5% down payment (3% from the borrower’s 
own funds), two months’ liquid reserves after closing, and a one-on-one 
counseling requirement. The purpose of the counseling requirement is for 
homebuyers to gain a better understanding of what it means to become a 
landlord, manage tenants, and maintain their new property. Counselors sit 
down with the homebuyer and create a monthly budget, discuss landlord-
tenant law and tenant’s rights, and review a property inspection report to 
help identify any potential pitfalls. These extra requirements not only help 
ensure that buyers are fully prepared, but help mitigate credit risk to the 
participating ONE Mortgage lender and to MHP. 
IV. HOMEBUYER EDUCATION AND COUNSELING 
SoftSecond and ONE Mortgage homebuyers are required to attend 
both pre- and post-purchase homebuyer education and counseling, a re-
quirement that helps them better prepare for the purchase of their first 
home. First-time homebuyers and repeat buyers who receive qualified 
homebuyer education are much less likely to default on their loans. (Brown 
2016, 168–69). To this end, Massachusetts Housing Partnership (MHP) 
partners with over forty non-profit homebuyer education and counseling 
organizations statewide that provide pre-purchase services. The curriculum 
is certified by the Massachusetts Homeownership Collaborative, managed 
by the Citizens Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA). Through these 
community providers, prospective homebuyers receive objective infor-
mation and advice from a series of industry professionals including a real 
estate agent, lender, home inspector, and attorney. The end result is an in-
formed, educated buyer who is better prepared for homeownership. 
Through the HomeSafe Program, ONE Mortgage borrowers are also 
required to attend a post-purchase class that helps introduce them to home-
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ownership. MHP has supported a network of ten community organizations 
that provide regular HomeSafe classes which cover topics such as budget-
ing as a homeowner, understanding the major systems of the home, mainte-
nance and repairs, insurance loss prevention, energy savings, and household 
hazards like lead paint, mold, and chemicals. Many insurance companies 
offer 5% to 10% annual discounts to graduates of these HomeSafe classes 
and both MHP and the City of Boston require homebuyers to attend as a 
condition of the mortgage loan. 
In addition to the homeownership education requirements, current 
SoftSecond and ONE Mortgage homeowners who are delinquent on their 
loans are automatically referred to foreclosure prevention counselors. This 
referral happens for borrowers who are reported 30, 60, 90, or 120+ days 
delinquent, as well as those who are reported as in process of foreclosure. 
The goal is to link struggling homeowners with professional counselors 
who will help to address the underlying causes of the delinquency. Counse-
lors conduct this outreach by telephone, email, or mail, and are available for 
in-person meetings with the borrower. These meetings might consist of re-
viewing the household budget, working with lenders to explore modifica-
tion options, or even helping to link struggling homeowners with employ-
ment or income-maximizing opportunities. These services are offered at no 
charge to the borrower. 
V. PROGRAM DEMOGRAPHICS 
The Massachusetts Housing Partnership (MHP) has maintained its fo-
cus on expanding the availability of mortgage credit on reasonable terms to 
otherwise underserved households of color across the Commonwealth. 
From July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016, fiscal year 2016 (FY16), 49% of ONE 
Mortgage homebuyers identified as non-white and/or Hispanic/Latino. In 
Boston, 61% of ONE Mortgage homebuyers identified as non-white and/or 
Hispanic/Latino. 
During FY16, the median household income for ONE Mortgage 
homebuyers was $55,899. This measure includes income from all adult 
household members as opposed to strictly borrower income. Overall, 61% 
of ONE Mortgage buyers had total household incomes below 80% of the 
area median income. The median purchase price was $218,000, and the me-
dian credit score was 738. 
Over the course of the twenty-five-year history of the programs, 
SoftSecond and ONE Mortgage have served homebuyers in 302 of the 351 
cities and towns in the Commonwealth. In FY16, 43% of ONE Mortgage 
homebuyers purchased in one of Massachusetts’ older industrial cities, such 
as Worcester, Lawrence, and Springfield, known as “Gateway Cities.” An-
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other 13% purchased in the City of Boston. The remaining 44% purchased 
in other communities. 
Esther Maycock-Thorne is among the homeowners who purchased a 
home through the SoftSecond program. She bought a single-family home in 
Brockton in 2003 after moving to the United States from Barbados some 
thirteen years earlier. In Barbados, her family lost their home due to her fa-
ther’s gambling debts and substance abuse. Esther was determined to 
achieve homeownership for her and her two daughters to gain the sense of 
security that owning a home can provide. She took a class with the Massa-
chusetts Affordable Housing Alliance (MAHA) and met other first-time 
homebuyers and a counselor who inspired her. Esther bought a home within 
one year of receiving a graduation certificate. Just five years later, her oldest 
daughter followed her path and was able to buy her first home with her hus-
band using the SoftSecond program. Esther’s daughter credits her mother’s 
example and success as a motivating factor in her own home-buying story. 
She is now raising two young boys who see the benefits of homeownership 
firsthand and when they go visit “Nanz.” 
VI. PERFORMANCE 
Historically, the delinquency and foreclosure rates for the SoftSecond 
and ONE Mortgage programs have generally tracked at or below the rate 
for all prime mortgage loans in Massachusetts as reported in the National 
Delinquency Survey. (Mortgage Bankers Association). However, since the 
2008 financial crisis, SoftSecond and ONE’s combined delinquency rate has 
increased to a level somewhat above prime loans, but still well below the 
aggregate rate for all loans in Massachusetts, including VA loans, which are 
administered by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, and Federal Hous-
ing Administration (FHA) loans. The programs’ foreclosure rate remains at 
or below the rate for all prime loans in Massachusetts. (Mortgage Bankers 
Association). Only 1.9% of the loans originated since the inception of the 
programs have resulted in default and liquidation (i.e., a foreclosure, short 
sale, or deed in lieu of foreclosure). If all loans currently in the process of 
foreclosure end in liquidation, that rate would be 2.4%. Defaults for loans 
originated in the years 2004 through 2008 are unusually high, which fol-
lows the pattern of the U.S. housing market as whole. These particular years 
stand out as ones in which the delinquency and loss figures were abnormal-
ly high when compared to other years. The programs’ relatively low delin-
quency and foreclosure numbers are attributed to a number of factors, in-
cluding the built-in affordability of the product, pre- and post-purchase 
homebuyer education, early-intervention delinquency and foreclosure coun-
2017] ONE Mortgage: An Affordable Lending Program Model 349 
seling, and the support of partner lenders who work closely with homebuy-
ers and homeowners throughout the entire process. 
The Massachusetts Community & Banking Council (MCBC), a col-
laborative forum for Massachusetts financial institutions and community 
organizations that meet and share information with the goal of affecting 
positive change in the availability of credit and financial services in Massa-
chusetts, has been reviewing the performance of SoftSecond and ONE 
Mortgage on a quarterly basis since 2000. A Delinquency Rate Comparison 
to all Massachusetts loans is shown at Figure 4, a Delinquency Rate Com-
parison to various types of loans over the past three years is shown at Figure 
5, and a Foreclosure Rate Comparison to various types of loans over the 
past three years is shown at Figure 6. The delinquency rate includes those 
loans that are reported to MHP as 30, 60, 90, 120, and 150+ days past due. 
The foreclosure rate includes those loans that are reported to MHP as in 
process of foreclosure or in bankruptcy. 
 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 5. Delinquency Rate Comparison 
 
    
2017] ONE Mortgage: An Affordable Lending Program Model 351 
Figure 6. Foreclosure Rate Comparison 
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VII. IMPACT 
A. Addressing Racial Inequalities 
Despite decades of efforts to address discrimination in mortgage lend-
ing and home purchases, Massachusetts still has the forty-eighth lowest 
homeownership rate for households of color among the fifty states. Home-
ownership rates for households of color are 43% higher nationally than in 
Massachusetts. (Corporation for Enterprise Development 2016). In Boston, 
for example, blacks and Latinos represent 35% of total households but ob-
tain only 10% of all home purchase loans. Statewide, blacks and Latinos 
represent 18% of the population but obtain less than 5% of all home pur-
chase loans. (Campen 2015, Appendix Table 3). National data show that 
simply achieving race-neutral homeownership rates would reduce the 
wealth gap between black and white households by one-third. (Sullivan et 
al. 2015, 9–15). 
As noted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in The Color of 
Wealth in Boston (Muñoz 2015, 2): 
In the coming decades, a significant rise in the share of nonwhite 
populations is projected nationwide. Population growth in the 
Boston MSA is already driven by the nonwhite population in-
crease. Thus, the financial well-being of communities of color is 
central to ensuring the inclusive long-term growth and prosperity 
of the Boston MSA. Unless net worth outcomes in communities 
of color improve, the aggregate magnitude of the wealth disparity 
will increase. This is a first-order public policy problem requiring 
immediate attention. 
(Id.). Continued expansion of the ONE Mortgage program is an important 
part of the public policy solutions needed to address the racial wealth gap in 
Massachusetts. Similar efforts are needed nationwide. 
B. Filling a Major Gap in the Market 
Creditworthy low- and moderate-income homebuyers in Massachu-
setts often pay disproportionately high interest rates and mortgage insurance 
fees when using mortgage products other than ONE. (Campen 2016; Figure 
2 supra). The result is reduced buying power and a higher monthly debt 
burden. ONE Mortgage delivers the lowest financing cost in the market 
while achieving foreclosure rates that are still substantially below the rates 
for prime mortgage loans (i.e., loans eligible for sale to the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”)). According to a recent analysis by the 
2017] ONE Mortgage: An Affordable Lending Program Model 353 
Urban Institute, households in the income range targeted by ONE Mortgage 
(60% to 100% of AMI) get the least benefit from federal housing programs 
and from mortgage interest and real estate tax deductions. (Steuerle et al. 
2014, 1–2). With a fixed housing payment and no cap on appreciation, ONE 
Mortgage affords creditworthy Massachusetts homeowners in that income 
range the best opportunity to create wealth and long-term financial stability. 
C. Revitalizing Cities and Stabilizing Neighborhoods 
There is strong evidence that ONE and SoftSecond mortgages help to 
stabilize neighborhoods in periods of economic distress. The City of Brock-
ton, for example, had the highest foreclosure rate of any city or town in 
Massachusetts during the recent recession and many of the subprime loans 
that defaulted were in the same neighborhoods and on the same streets as 
SoftSecond homeowners. (Davis 2014). Despite abysmal market conditions, 
hundreds of SoftSecond homeowners in Brockton were able to weather the 
storm and less than 1% ever defaulted and lost their homes. The fact that so 
many homes in the same neighborhoods remained safely owner-occupied 
through the crisis helped keep vacancy and abandonment in the city from 
becoming far worse. That stabilization effect from SoftSecond loans oc-
curred in every major city in Massachusetts. 
VIII. CREDIT MODEL FOR THE FUTURE 
Several key elements have worked in combination to ensure the long-
term success of the SoftSecond and ONE Mortgage programs. 
A. Program Eligibility Limited to Well-Prepared Borrowers 
Participation in the ONE Mortgage and SoftSecond programs requires 
a homebuyer education certificate from a program accredited by the Massa-
chusetts Homeownership Collaborative. Accredited programs must adhere 
to minimum curriculum requirements, provide a minimum number of hours 
over multiple sessions, and adhere to a strict conflict of interest policy to 
ensure that homebuyers are not steered to particular lenders or loan prod-
ucts. Homebuyer education generally occurs, and ideally occurs, well be-
fore a consumer has made a decision to pursue homeownership, let alone 
before they have looked at properties or engaged in discussion with pro-
spective lenders. In some cases, homebuyer education is effective in con-
vincing consumers to delay or forego homeownership; in many cases, it 
results in strategies for budgeting, credit repair, and regular savings that 
lead to a successful home purchase months or even years later. Too many 
programs push the envelope on convincing banks to lend to households 
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with lower credit scores rather than focus on improving the credit profiles 
of low- to moderate-income borrowers. ONE Mortgage has focused from 
the start on long-term success and not short-term results, and that has served 
the program and its homebuyers well over the years. 
B. Data-Driven Underwriting Standards 
Although the original intent of the SoftSecond program was to break 
down barriers that kept low- and moderate-income buyers from gaining ac-
cess to credit, there was also great care to ensure that borrowers were not 
getting into debt over their heads. First-time buyers themselves helped to 
see this clearly back in 1990 when the program was designed. Bankers at 
the time offered to raise debt-to-income ratios and buyers pushed back with 
a greater focus on the overall affordability of the monthly mortgage pay-
ment. Maximum mortgage debt and overall debt-to-income ratios never 
ventured far beyond secondary market norms. Minimum down payments 
never dropped below 3%, and always required that a significant portion be 
from the borrower’s own funds and not simply from down payment assis-
tance. Again, this requirement was reinforced by advocacy from potential 
first-time homebuyers. 
Community organizers heard loud and clear from the target home-
buying population that this program should always require a down payment. 
They reasoned that buying a home should not be easier than buying a car. 
The only comparatively aggressive underwriting policies were for recogni-
tion of rental income on owner-occupied three-family properties, a housing 
type that is unique to the Northeast, that experiences much more market 
volatility than one- and two-family homes, and that has historically created 
a great wealth building opportunity for low-income buyers. 
Long before the Great Recession, MHP looked for opportunities to re-
fine and improve underwriting standards and presented its delinquency data 
to quarterly meetings of the Massachusetts Community and Banking Coun-
cil. Staff at the Center for Community Capital at University of North Caro-
lina Chapel Hill (UNC) were engaged by MHP in 2010 to examine twenty 
years of loan performance relative to specific underwriting characteristics. 
Their final report, summarized in “Determinants of Mortgage Default” 
(Park 2010, 1–19), included analysis that led to somewhat higher minimum 
credit scores, modifications to debt-to-income ratio exceptions, and the un-
derwriting of rental income in two- and three-family properties. In January 
2010, minimum credit scores were increased from 620 to 660 for condo-
miniums and single-family properties, and from 660 to 680 for two- and 
three-family properties. Our maximum housing-to-income ratio for condo-
miniums and single-family properties was lowered from 38% to 36%, and 
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our maximum debt-to-income ratio for condominiums and single-family 
properties was lowered from 45% to 43%. Additionally, in February 2012, 
instead of subtracting 75% of projected rental income from the borrower’s 
principal, interest, taxes, and insurance (PITI), we began adding 65% of 
gross monthly rental income to the borrower’s qualifying income. These 
changes reduced instances of default while affecting a relatively small 
number of actual, or potential, borrowers. 
C. Targeted to Borrowers Who Are Good Credit Risks 
SoftSecond and ONE Mortgage are not subprime loan programs; they 
were designed to seek out “prime” low-income borrowers who are over-
looked by conventional credit providers. Average FICO scores are now well 
into the 730s, and the minimum score is now 660. Although the program 
did not start off with minimum credit scores—and a few early loans were 
made to borrowers with scores in the high 500s and low 600s—later regres-
sion analysis found that FICO scores were a strong predictor of default risk. 
One of the greatest ongoing challenges for ONE Mortgage is how to 
evaluate so-called “non-traditional credit” for homebuyers who are histori-
cally debt-adverse, have a history of paying all obligations in cash, and do 
not have enough established credit lines to support a representative FICO 
score. In previous years, the SoftSecond program gave participating lenders 
flexibility to review and approve alternative credit, but default rates for 
those loans were disproportionately high. MHP subsequently created its 
own non-traditional credit guidelines for the ONE Mortgage, modeled 
closely to the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) 
standard, but concerns remain that those standards may exclude some very 
creditworthy borrowers, particularly among recent immigrants. 
D. Expands Purchasing Power Through Graduated Payment Model 
Many teaser rates and interest rate buy-downs are nothing but a gim-
mick to encourage and mislead borrowers into buying homes with larger 
mortgage loans then they can really afford. (Gurun et al. 2016, 4–5). The 
graduated payment structure of those SoftSecond and ONE Mortgage loans 
with interest subsidy are completely different, because they were designed 
with input from lower-income buyers and make conservative assumptions 
to ensure that monthly mortgage payments do not outstrip the rise in house-
hold income over time, assuming a modest rate of increase. Interest rates 
are fixed at closing. Subsidized borrowers’ monthly payments are constant 
for the first three years, and then payments increase once per year (general-
ly within a $25 to $35 monthly payment increase) before leveling off in 
year eight. Loan performance analysis confirmed that these scheduled 
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monthly payment increases had no measurable impact on delinquencies and 
defaults. (Park 2010, 9–19). 
E. Avoids the Cost of Mortgage Insurance and Guarantee Fees 
Lenders participating in the SoftSecond and ONE Mortgage programs 
have agreed to originate high loan-to-value (LTV) loans with reliance on a 
state-funded loan loss reserve in lieu of costly private mortgage insurance. 
That approach has dramatically reduced financing costs for borrowers with-
out exposing lenders to undue risk, particularly because of the checks and 
balances that distinguish SoftSecond and ONE Mortgage loans from other, 
less disciplined high LTV mortgage products. Federal Housing Administra-
tion (FHA) insurance, private mortgage insurance, and Fannie Mae and 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) guarantee fees 
are all overpriced for creditworthy low- and moderate-income borrowers. 
(Campen 2016; Figure 2 supra). State-funded reserves are sized to cover 
losses during all normal market cycles, are initially oversized to encourage 
smaller community banks to participate, and proved sufficient to fully cover 
loan losses for all but a few SoftSecond lenders during the recession and 
national foreclosure crisis, with very little impact on their willingness to 
continue offering these loans. 
When a participating lender experiences a loss event on a SoftSecond 
or ONE Mortgage loan, it is able to file a claim on the loan loss reserve 
fund. MHP will review the loan loss claim to ensure that all policies and 
guidelines were followed, and that the participating lender used its best 
business judgment to minimize the loss. 
SoftSecond and ONE Mortgage loan loss reserves serve the same pur-
pose, but function differently in a few ways. Their funding structures differ 
in that SoftSecond loan loss reserves were funded at a rate equal to 3% of 
the second mortgage. Therefore, for each SoftSecond loan that a participat-
ing lender originated, 3% of that second mortgage went into their pooled 
fund. However, the ONE Mortgage loan loss reserve is structured so that 
each lender’s first five loans will be funded at 5% of the mortgage amount, 
and each subsequent loan will be funded at 1% of the mortgage amount. 
Under both programs, lenders are able to file a claim on the pooled amount. 
Second, the SoftSecond loan loss reserve only covered losses on the 20% 
second mortgage. Therefore, participating lenders held top-loss risk consist-
ing of the entire first mortgage. However, the ONE Mortgage loan loss re-
serve is structured so that participating lenders and MHP retain shared risk, 
with MHP covering 80% of qualifying loan loss claims on the originating 
lenders’ total credit exposure on a defaulted mortgage loan. 
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The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has supported the SoftSecond 
and ONE Mortgage programs through six terms of both Democratic and 
Republican Governors. Therefore, the program has received consistent 
funding throughout its history. Additionally, because of our ability to recap-
ture interest subsidy when borrowers transfer or sell the property, we have 
the ability to recycle subsidy funds for use on new ONE Mortgage loans. 
F. Lenders Retain Credit Risk and Have Skin in the Game 
One of the most important lessons from the financial crisis is that 
mortgage loans are more likely to default when the loan originators have no 
financial stake in their performance. Although the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act specifically required loan originators 
to retain risk in all but the safest loans (Dodd-Frank Act § 941), this re-
quirement was watered down under pressure from Wall Street. (Wilmarth 
2013, 1322–27). 
With ONE Mortgage and SoftSecond, participating lenders have full 
exposure for any credit losses that exceed state-funded reserves. With just a 
few exceptions (e.g., on rare occasions when loans may be sold from one 
Massachusetts lender to another) the originating lender retains loan servic-
ing for the life of the loan. That combination of factors strongly discourages 
lenders from originating loans where they may have concerns about credit 
quality. 
An analysis MHP presented to federal regulators in support of a strong 
risk retention rule found that banks’ retained risk in SoftSecond loans added 
only a fraction of a point to the financing cost while achieving an eightfold 
reduction in losses compared to national credit model predictions for loans 
made to borrowers with the same incomes, down payments, and credit 
scores. (MHP 2011). 
G. Immediate Intervention and Non-Profit Counseling for Delinquent Loans 
The Massachusetts Affordable Housing Alliance (MAHA) developed 
its HomeSafe program in 1996, just five years after the launch of the 
SoftSecond program. MHP expanded the HomeSafe program statewide a 
couple of years later, and this unique approach to ongoing support has 
proven to be successful. The two major features of HomeSafe are: 1) a six-
hour class designed to reach new homeowners during the first year of 
homeownership with answers to their many questions, and financial incen-
tives from insurance companies and hardware stores to help ensure partici-
pation in the classes, and 2) a dedicated early intervention counseling model 
that emphasizes non-profit outreach to borrowers, not the other way around 
that predominated in the aftermath of the subprime crisis. This early inter-
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vention model, where non-profit counselors reach out to delinquent home-
owners who experience a 30+ day delinquency, is part of what keeps our 
serious delinquency and loss rates so low. 
Taken together with the intensive pre-purchase counseling, the home-
buyer education and counseling requirements are substantial and downright 
old-fashioned. With the advent of online tools, some in the mortgage indus-
try are looking to help consumers bypass human interaction altogether. 
“Press button, get mortgage” from Quicken Loans is just one of many pure-
ly technical approaches to mortgage origination. In Massachusetts, counsel-
ing organizations have embraced an online platform for educating borrow-
ers about the home buying process, but they have also insisted on in-person 
follow-up counseling for those accessing the online class. At MAHA, 15% 
of graduates access the online class. But surprisingly, those online education 
graduates crave the in-person follow-up session as much as those who 
choose the traditional four-session class. We need to find ways to continue 
to provide high-touch counseling services, while also recognizing the tech-
nological capability and preferences of potential borrowers, if we are to 
maintain the same supports that have served ONE borrowers so well over 
the last twenty-five years. 
CONCLUSION 
ONE Mortgage, and its predecessor, the SoftSecond Loan Program, 
would not have been possible without the bipartisan support of the state 
legislature and seven governors over two and one-half decades, along with a 
coalition of lenders, a strong network of community organizations, and state 
and municipal officials that have remained steadfast through several market 
cycles. There is no other bank-financed mortgage program in the country 
that has achieved comparable community impact or loan performance at 
this scale or over this long a period of time. With standard underwriting and 
administration that have been systematized, the programs have had remark-
able results in Massachusetts and demonstrate a replicable credit model. 
Through an effective public-private partnership, ONE Mortgage demon-
strates that lower-income families can be successful homeowners. 
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